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ABSTRACT
The dominant approach to addressing violence against women in Egypt today is carceral,
or relying on the punitive instruments of the state to achieve justice (most visibly
represented by the prison and police). While carceral responses are perhaps unsurprisingly
advocated by state feminism, they are also promoted by what would typically be described
as anti-state actors. This paradoxical entanglement takes place during what I identify as
the 'carceral moment', a period marked by the intensification of political and social
repression and during which incarceration appears more readily available as a solution to
remedy perceived problems of governance. I argue that, in this moment, carceral
sensibilities dominate among anti-state activism, which often criticizes state violations,
such as the conditions under which (mostly political) detainees are held, but fails to
demonstrate similar opposition to the prison as such. This project is therefore an attempt
to understand the history, extent and context of this limitation, which is understood to be
an effect of what is globally known as carceral feminism (CF), or law-and-order feminism.
I argue that, alongside CF, perpetual states of emergency imposed in Egypt have also had
severe repercussions on its current feminist imaginary, resulting in minor concessions
granted by the carceral state being perceived as victories and rendering its carcerality
secondary. The United States-specific nature of the prison abolitionist feminist tradition –
the leading source of opposition to carceral feminism – is also analyzed. Focusing
primarily on the lack of space for thought about alternative approaches to justice rather
than locating manifestations of CF in Egypt, this thesis makes the case for orienting the
contemporary feminist imaginary away from carceral currents and towards alternative
approaches to justice.
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I.

Introduction

In 2019, Egyptian lawyer and activist Malek Adly published a post on Facebook praising
police lieutenant Hossam El-Ashmawy for following up with a sexual harassment incident
targeting Adly’s friend and fellow lawyer and activist, Asmaa Naiem. 1 The incident was
not reported; El-Ashmawy decided to proceed with investigations after allegedly reading
Naiem’s testimony of it, also on Facebook. El-Ashmawy is widely believed to have been
involved in the shooting of April 6 Youth Movement activist Sayed Wezza (in addition to
other protestors) in 2013. 2 When this fact was brought to his attention in the comments
section by uneasy friends and fellow activists, Adly chose not to retract his praise, arguing
that the allegations against El-Ashmawy did not negate this positive encounter he had with
him.3
Adly’s position illustrates how the resort to carceral approaches to address violence against
women is paradoxically promoted by what would typically be described as anti-state actors
in Egypt. This entanglement takes place during what I call a carceral moment, marked by
an ongoing and arbitrary policy by the Egyptian state in which incarceration appears more
readily available as a solution to remedy perceived political and social problems. While
critics have pointed out the arbitrariness of arrests and denounced the conditions under
which (mostly political) detainees are held, there remains a notable absence of opposition
to the prison as such. That is, carceral sensibilities continue to dominate among anti-state
activism, and activists continue to draw on tools of the state to achieve justice. This project
is an attempt to understand how and why this is the case.

To that end, the continued resort of local feminist activism today to state-sanctioned
methods of justice for violence against women is understood as an effect of what is known
globally as carceral feminism, in which a ‘feminism-as-crime-control’ model prevails over

1

Malek Adly via Facebook (2019). Accessed October 1, 2019
https://www.facebook.com/malek.adly.39/posts/818181058637138
2
Amira El-Fekki, Mass Trial for Revolutionary Activists Adjourned to 7 December, Daily News Egypt,
November 7, 2015 https://wwww.dailynewssegypt.com/2015/11/07/mass-trial-for-revolutionary-activistsadjourned-to-7-december/
3
Malek Adly via Facebook (2019). Accessed October 1, 2019
https://www.facebook.com/malek.adly.39/posts/818778215244089
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an earlier focus on economic justice and liberation. 4 Coinciding with the rise of
neoliberalism, this model has gained its global status through a process of ‘NGOization’,
with the help of international UN agencies and conferences.5

In the following, I argue that, alongside NGOization, the perpetual state of emergency
imposed in Egypt has severely impacted the current feminist imaginary, resulting in
concessions given rarely and randomly by the carceral state being perceived as victories
and rendering its carcerality secondary. In so doing, I focus on highlighting the absence of
room for thought about alternative approaches to justice rather than locating manifestations
of carceral feminism in Egypt. Finally, I shed light on the importance of orienting the
feminist imaginary away from carceral currents and towards alternative approaches to
justice.

Towards these goals, the first chapter of the thesis locates features of the contemporary
carceral moment in Egypt, which is marked by an intensification of political and social
repression, and increased absence of due process and other violations of prisoner rights,
such as access to adequate food, clothing or healthcare. Chapter two discusses the marked
absence of criticism of the prison as such, despite evident frustration directed at issues such
as torture or other violations of (often political) prisoner rights. The chapter explores some
of the ways in which the women’s movement in Egypt finds itself in paradoxical
entanglements with the carceral politics of the state in its advocacy. Chapter three
investigates further the reasons for the prevalence of carceral sensibilities among activist
circles, attributing them to the inherently American nature of the abolitionist framework
as well as the absence of alternatives under the perpetual state of emergency imposed
across the country. The final chapter is an attempt at tackling the challenging task of
envisioning alternative justice approaches to violence against women. Grassroots feminist
collective Operation Anti-Sexual Harassment (OpAntiSH) and other initiatives are brought
together and analyzed as attempts towards alternative justice approaches.

Elizabeth Bernstein, Carceral Politics as Gender Justice? The ‘Traffic in Women’ and Neoliberal
Circuits of Crime, Sex, and Rights, 41 Theory Soc 233–259, 235 (2007).
5
Islah Jad, NGO-ization of Arab Women’s Movements, 35 Inst Dev Stud Bull 34-42 (2003).
4
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II.

Mapping the Carceral

This chapter serves to provide some background into Egypt’s carceral moment6– a moment
in which incarceration is increasingly employed by the State as a method to respond to
perceived ailments of society in general, whether they are political in nature or not. In what
follows, I identify two key features of this moment: first, accelerated and widespread
political and social repression, and second, a related retreat of due process in the legal
system.

The first feature refers to a broad range of activities undertaken by the State, whereby all
and any forms of group affiliation (much less mobilization) are identified as a security
threat to be eliminated through incarceration. It is likely that this can be traced back to its
origin point taking place in August of 2013, on the day of the military and police-led
dispersal of the sit-in organized by supporters of then-President Mohamed Morsi
protesting his removal from office – the event which later came to be known as the Raba’a
Massacre.7 What followed was a massive crackdown on Muslim Brotherhood leaders,
members, and non-affiliated sympathizers, in the form of mass arrests, military-court
ordered death sentences, and even casual harassment of bearded men, 8 kicking off what is
now a 7-year war on terror.9 Mohamed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Islamists in
general, represent an obvious and historical threat to the current State apparatus, with the
rivalry between the two groups dating back to the Nasser regime.10 To the State, such clear

In which ‘punitive orientations’, as theorized by Ruby Tapia, prevail: ‘the carceral state, operating
through punitive orientations, functions as an obstacle and a substitute for humane solutions to social
problems’: What is the Carceral State?, Documenting Criminalization and Confinement (May 15, 2020)
https://storymaps.arcgis.com/stories/7ab5f5c3fbca46c38f0b2496bcaa5ab0.
7
An estimated number of 800+ protesters are believed to have died in the process of evacuation: Egyptian
Interior Minister Says Rabaa Will be Remembered for Police Martyrs, Ahram Online (Aug. 8, 2014)
http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/108684/Egypt/Politics-/Egyptian-interior-minister-saysRabaa-will-be-reme.aspx.
8
Maged Abouel Dahab, Egypt's Fear of the Beard, Middle East Monitor (June 23, 2015)
https://www.middleeasteye.net/features/egypts-fear-beard.
9
Ahmed Abou Zeid, Egypt’s Necessary War on Terror, Egypt MFA Blog (Oct. 26, 2016)
https://mfaegypt.org/2016/10/26/egypts-necessary-war-on-terror/.
10
Nicola Pratt & Dina Rezk, Securitizing the Muslim Brotherhood: State Violence and Authoritarianism in
Egypt After the Arab Spring, 50 Secur Dialogue 239 (2019).
6
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political rivalry expands to constitute a solid raison d’etre, 11 and warrants the elimination
– primarily through incarceration – of Islamists as major opponents. 12

Still, other historically (relatively) influential groups have also been targets of the State,
albeit less viciously. The Egyptian Medical Syndicate, commonly referred to as the
Doctors Syndicate, is one such group. The Doctors Syndicate, as well as the Lawyers and
Journalists Syndicates, is relevant because of its potential for political activity, evidenced
by the role it played in organizing different forms of antigovernment protests in the past.13
In July 2020, at least 8 doctors were detained after speaking out online against the
government’s response and lack of adequate equipment with respect to the COVID-19
pandemic.14 After prime minister Mustafa Madbouly criticized the performance of doctors
following an increase in patient deaths and accused them of negligence, the treasurer of
the Syndicate, Mohamed El-Fawal called for their release via Facebook, only to be
detained himself as well.15

For the Syndicate, members have lost whatever little power was afforded to them by virtue
of the ‘professional’ nature of their work, and the association as a whole appears to have
lost the power it once had to mobilize or influence its members. Historically, syndicates
are understood to function as ‘official’ labour unions, and are tasked first and foremost
with advancing the status and privileges of their members in society. 16 And yet, whether it
is because of the doctors criticizing state performance or offering obituaries to political
rivals, they are, to some extent, perceived and therefore treated (imprisoned) as political

11

Amy Hawthorne and Ashraf El Sherif, A Dangerous Deterioration: Egypt Under al-Sisi, Project on
Middle East Democacy (June 21, 2017) https://pomed.org/a-dangerous-deterioration-egypt-under-al-sisi-aconversation-with-dr-ashraf-el-sherif/: “...al-Sisi’s legitimacy, originally based on grandiose promises of
delivering full security and economic growth, has narrowed to fear-mongering against the despised
Brotherhood, fighting terrorism, and preventing chaos.”
12
Pratt & Rezk, supra note 10, at 239.
13
Mona Abaza, Cairo: Restoration? And the Limits of Street Politics, 20 Space Cult 170 (2017)
https://journals-sagepubcom.libproxy.aucegypt.edu/doi/full/10.1177/1206331217697137?utm_source=summon&utm_medium=dis
covery-provider.
14
Owen Dyer, Covid-19: At Least Eight Doctors in Egypt Arrested for Criticising Government Response,
The BMJ (July 15, 2020) https://www.bmj.com/content/370/bmj.m2850.
15
Id.
16
Robert Springborg, Professional Syndicates in Egyptian Politics, 1952-1970, 9 Int J Middle East Stud
275 (1978).
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actors acting in potential opposition to the State – not entirely different from the Muslim
Brotherhood.

But incarceration is also used as an automatic response to perceived threats to the State not
emanating from political expression. In other words, punitive measures are taken against
both dissenters and non-dissenters alike, from well-known anti-State activists to social
media sensations. For example, since April 2020, at least 9 young women online content
creators across the country have been arrested by the authorities on charges of violating
‘family values’ on the popular social media application, TikTok. Mawada al-Adham,
Haneen Hossam, as well as three other unnamed defendants were sentenced to two years
in prison in addition to a fine of LE300,000 on these charges. 17
As currently articulated in chapter III of law No. 175/2018, titled ‘Crimes Related to
Invasion of Privacy and Illegal Content of Law’, family values are not defined. 18 It is
therefore difficult to identify what exactly constitutes family values or what constitutes
their violation, since there is no existing criteria or framework for doing so.19 It is perhaps
worth mentioning that Mawada, Haneen, and others facing the same charges are not
politically active women: the majority of their activities online consists of (naturally)
apolitical dance challenges or other entertainment content.

Some activists have highlighted the fact that all the women arrested come from specific
class backgrounds (working and middle class): ‘In the case of Mawada and Haneen, there

17

How Family Values are Used Against Women: Q&A with Lobna Darwish, Mada Masr (Aug. 4, 2020)
https://www.madamasr.com/en/2020/08/04/feature/politics/how-family-values-are-used-against-womenqa-with-lobna-darwish/.
18
Article 25: ‘A penalty of imprisonment for a period of no less than six months and a fine of not less than
fifty thousand pounds and not exceeding one hundred thousand pounds, or one of these two penalties, shall
be inflicted on whoever violates any of the principles or values of the family in the Egyptian society,
violates the sanctity of private life or sends heavily From electronic messages to a specific person without
his consent, or granting personal data to a system or website to promote goods or services without his
consent, or publishing through the information network or by any means of information technology
information, news, pictures and the like, violating the privacy of any person without his consent Whether
the information published is correct or incorrect.’
19
How Family Values are Used Against Women: Q&A with Lobna Darwish, Mada Masr (Aug. 4, 2020)
https://www.madamasr.com/en/2020/08/04/feature/politics/how-family-values-are-used-against-womenqa-with-lobna-darwish/.
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was a state of incitement during the investigation and the phrase “profiting from the
internet” was repeated a lot as an accusation. This goes back to the general monitoring and
ambushing of any content by women on the internet, which is always linked to their class
position’.20 Perhaps more interestingly, researcher Dina Wahba noted that cases similar to
the TikTok girls’ are not unheard of; complaints were lodged against TV entertainment
figures such as belly-dancers or actresses in the past, but by individual citizens. 21 This time
around, the case against the TikTok girls was pursued independently by the State. 22 This
marks a shift in the approach taken by the State to remedy perceived social problems, in
which incarceration appears more readily available and implemented as a solution.

As noted earlier, political and social repression in the country takes place alongside an
increased absence of due process. That is, the most basic of rights for those arrested or
detained are continuously and randomly violated. To illustrate this, one could look at the
events of September 2019, in which small waves of unorganized anti-government protests
took place across the country, in what is thought to be the result of a call to action by exiled
former military contractor, Mohamed Ali. 23 The demonstrations, estimated to be in the
mere hundreds, were quickly and violently dispersed by security forces.24 In the following,
the aftermath of the protests is analyzed as one manifestation of the ongoing absence of
due process.

On the night of the protests in Cairo, heavy security presence surrounded Tahrir Square,
with several police cars positioning themselves in the area. Crowds began to form

Basil El-Dabh, Egypt’s TikTok Crackdown and “Family Values”, Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy
(Aug. 13, 2020) https://timep.org/commentary/analysis/egypts-tiktok-crackdown-and-family-values/.
21
DW News interview with Dina Wahba, via Facebook
https://www.facebook.com/deutschewellenews/videos/232044767877260.
22
For example, lawyers Amro Abdelsalam and Samir Sabri (notorious for taking celebrities to court over
similar complaints) lodged the 2018 case against well-established actress Rania Youssef accusing her of
inciting debauchery for wearing a see-through dress at a red-carpet event. Youssef was never arrested, nor
made to pay a fine: Egyptian Actress to Face Trial for Wearing Inappropriate Dress, AFP (Dec. 2, 2018)
https://english.alarabiya.net/en/life-style/entertainment/2018/12/02/Egyptian-actress-to-face-trial-forwearing-inappropriate-dress-.
23
Heavy Security Clampdown on Anti-Sisi Protests as State Mobilizes Supporters to Rally, Mada Masr
(Sept. 27, 2019) https://www.madamasr.com/en/2019/09/27/news/politics/ongoing-coverage-of-september27-protests-in-egypt/.
24
Id.
20
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following the conclusion of a football match between popular local clubs, El-Ahly and
Zamalek. The suppression of the highly unorganized protests, taking the form of violent
and random arrests of both protesters and non-participating bystanders, happened quickly,
before the crowds could even begin to formulate intelligible chants typical of antigovernment demonstrations. The use of rubber and live bullets to disperse crowds was
recorded in the governorate of Suez.25

The wave of arrests did not come to an end that night. Instead, a massive, nationwide
crackdown ensued. The following Friday, Downtown Cairo was effectively on lock-down,
with all roads leading to the Square from neighboring areas blocked by security forces. 26
In the week between, it was estimated that 1,500 people were arrested and held in pre-trial
detention facing no particular charges. 27 Security checkpoints were set up across the
country, in which regular cell-phone inspections by the police became the new norm.28
Inactive political figures who did not participate in the call for protests were arrested from
their homes, including academics such as Khaled Dawoud and Hassan Nafea. 29 Activist
Mahienour El-Massry was kidnapped by plainclothes police outside the Supreme State
Security Prosecution after attending investigations with those arrested on the night of the
protests in her capacity as a defense lawyer.30 All three remain in pre-trial detention at the
time of writing. Overall, an estimated four thousand people, activists as well as non-

25

Protesters and Police Clash in Egypt for Second Day Running, AFP (Sept. 22, 2019)
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/22/protesters-and-police-clash-in-egypt-for-second-dayrunning.
26
Heavy Security Clampdown on Anti-Sisi Protests as State Mobilizes Supporters to Rally, Mada Masr
(Sept. 27, 2019) https://www.madamasr.com/en/2019/09/27/news/politics/ongoing-coverage-of-september27-protests-in-egypt/.
27
Id.
28
Jared Malsin & Amira El Fekki, Egypt Curbs Online Dissent With Street Searches: ‘He Asked to See My
Phone’ (Oct. 7, 2019) https://www.wsj.com/articles/egypt-curbs-online-dissent-with-street-searches-heasked-to-see-my-phone-11570440602.
29
Ruth Michaelson, Egyptian Authorities Threaten to 'Decisively Confront' Protesters, The Guardian
(Sept. 26, 2019) https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/sep/26/over-1900-arrested-as-egypt-braces-formore-protests.
30
Lawyer Mahienour al-Massry Arrested and Karama Party Leader Appears Before Supreme State
Security Prosecution After Forced Disappearance, Mada Masr (Sept. 22, 2019)
https://www.madamasr.com/en/2019/09/22/news/politics/lawyer-mahienour-al-massry-arrested-andkarama-party-leader-appears-before-supreme-state-security-prosecution-after-forced-disappearance/.
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activists, were arrested in the aftermath of the 20th of September, bringing the total
population of political prisoners to an estimated sixty thousand people. 31

The aftermath has been described in the media as the worst wave of repression since the
dispersal of Raba’a.32 Yet what stands out is not so much the number of those arrested as
it is the conditions under which they are held. For example, among those arrested is activist
Alaa Abdelfattah, who had, at the time, just completed a five-year sentence he had received
in 2015 for ‘organizing a political protest without requesting authorization’. 33 Alaa was
detained from Dokki police station, where he was required to sign in daily from 6 p.m. to
6 a.m. for an additional five years in compliance with the terms of his probation. 34 While
attending investigations at the State Prosecution in his capacity as Alaa’s lawyer,
Mohamed El-Baqer was also arrested.

At the time of writing, Alaa remains in pre-trial detention in Tora Maximum Security
prison, where authorities – under the pretense of implementing regulations to curb the
spread of COVID-19 – have routinely denied his family the right to visit him or to
exchange letters.35 On June 22nd, 2020 Alaa’s sisters and mother were spending the night
in front of Tora prison in protest of these violations when they were attacked by a mob of
plainclothes women (police officers were present but did not intervene in the incident). 36
While waiting to file a complaint with the public prosecutor’s office documenting the
incident, Sanaa Seif, Alaa’s younger sister, was abducted in a minivan and later appeared
in the State Prosecution. She is currently being held in pre-trial detention on charges of
spreading false news and rumours via her social media accounts for the purposes of

31

Michaelson, supra note 29.
Egypt: Largest Wave of Mass Arrests Since President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi Came to Power, Amnesty
International (October 2, 2019) https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/10/egypt-largest-wave-ofmass-arrests-since-president-abdel-fattah-al-sisi-came-to-power/.
33
Egyptian Activist Alaa Abdel Fattah Released from Jail After Five Years, BBC (Mar. 29, 2019)
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-47746481.
34
Id.
35
Egypt Prisoner Alaa Abdelfattah’s Family Beaten Outside Tora Prison, Middle East Monitor (June 22,
2020) https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20200622-egypt-prisoner-alaa-abdelfattahs-family-beatenoutside-tora-prison/.
36
Egyptian Activist Sanaa Seif Arrested After Alleged Assault Outside Tora Prison, Egyptian Streets (June
24, 2020) https://egyptianstreets.com/2020/06/24/egyptian-activist-sanaa-seif-arrested-after-allegedassault-outside-tora-prison/.
32
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‘stirring public opinion against state institutions’ and ‘disturbing security and peace and
disrupting the institutions of the state from their work’.37

It is important that the arbitrariness of the ongoing incarceration frenzy be understood and
situated in its authoritarian context. In saying this, the intention is not to claim that prisons
are ‘normal’ anywhere, but to point out the extent to which uncertainty and abuse feature
heavily in Egyptian prisons, in a way that is perhaps unmatched in other, non-authoritarian
contexts. Visits and other forms of communication with detainees is oftentimes prohibited,
resulting in families going weeks and months without hearing from or even about their
imprisoned relatives.38 Families are also denied the right to deposit money, medicine, or
food for inmates. On the other side, prisoners are continually denied the right to attend
investigations regarding their cases, and attorneys have limited communication with their
clients. The conditions of prison itself are notoriously dangerous for being overcrowded
and unsanitary, as well as lacking temperature control.39 Medical negligence is rampant:
in May of 2020, 24-year-old filmmaker Shady Habash, held in pre-trial detention three
months beyond the legal maximum of two years, died in his cell two days after allegedly
ingesting a quantity of ethyl alcohol. 40 According to a statement released by the Public
Prosecution, Shady was taken to the prison clinic several times, but died before he could
be moved to a hospital. 41 A hunger strike protesting neglect on part of the prison
administration was launched by inmates in Shady’s cell block, but quickly came to an end
after the administration retaliated by revoking exercise time and other measures. 42 Other

37

Id.
Prisoners of Conscience in Egypt: No Release, No Trial, No Visits, Arabic Network for Human Rights
Information (June 30, 2020) https://www.anhri.info/?p=17521&lang=en.
39
Heba Wanis, Health In Egyptian Prisons: A Field Study on the Determinants of Health Behind Bars,
EIPR (17 June, 2014) https://www.eipr.org/sites/default/files/reports/pdf/health_in_prison_e.pdf.
40
Hadeer El-Mahdawy, Shady Habash’s Slow Death, Mada Masr (May 7, 2020)
https://www.madamasr.com/en/2020/05/07/feature/politics/shady-habashs-slow-death/.
41
Id.
42
Id.
38
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cases of fatal medical negligence include former President Mohamed Morsi43 and
politician and former Muslim Brotherhood leader Essam El-Erian.44

It is perhaps useful to note here that the above notes about prison conditions and the extent
to which abuse is featured within and around them are not intended to be brought in as
exceptional circumstances without which incarceration would become an ideal justice
mechanism. That is, the conditions surrounding prisons in Egypt should be viewed as
central to and not exceptions to their operative role for maintaining grip of the state. As
such, reforms of the prison to curb certain abuses (i.e., make the prison ‘normal’) would
not reduce the extent to which they are deployed by the state to repress both political and
non-political actors. It is with this understanding that leading abolitionist movements in
the United States (discussed further in following sections), and in which prisoners do not
grapple with abuses of the frequent and arbitrary nature described above, are wary of the
undertaking of reform as a political project. 45

Other markers of repression feature alongside prison abuses, some of which are not
restricted to what is typically thought of as politics. Some predate September 2019, and
some appear to be part of the backlash. One example of the latter is the continued heavy
police presence on the streets, the state of which never really recovered following the
events of September 2019. Such presence materializes primarily in police checkpoints set
up on an ad hoc basis, one of the ‘main practices through which surveillance and
monitoring as a technique of management of population in space is carried out’, in which

43

Ruth Michaelson, Mohamed Morsi, Ousted President of Egypt, Dies in Court, The Guardian (June 17,
2019) https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/17/mohamed-morsi-dead-ousted-president-egyptcollapses-after-court-session.
44
Ehab Al-Taher, Secretary-General of the Doctors Syndicate, was forced to resign following pressure
from the State after the Syndicate published an online obituary for El-Erian, who had previously served as
the Syndicate’s treasurer: Al Masry Al Youm, Obituary Controversy Causes Secretary General of Egypt
Doctors Syndicate to Resign, Egypt Independent (Aug. 17, 2020) https://egyptindependent.com/obituarycontroversy-causes-secretary-general-of-egypt-doctors-syndicate-to-resign/.
45
Mimi E. Kim, Anti-Carceral Feminism: The Contradictions of Progress and the Possibilities of CounterHegemonic Struggle, 35(3) Affilia 309-326, 318 (2020).
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police officers arbitrarily stop and interrogate citizens about their whereabouts and other
random information.46

Other ventures of the State, mostly related to the overambitious restructuring and
rebranding of Cairo, were decided long before. For example, the decision to move four
sphinxes and an obelisk from the period of Ramses II from the Karnak temple in Luxor to
Tahrir Square has been described by some as an attempt by the State to erase contemporary
history: ‘it covers over the recent memory that is alive in the minds of many people, with
something historical that has no political connotations or significance’.47 Most recently, in
July 2020, authorities demolished parts of an ancient necropolis listed by UNESCO as a
World Heritage site, known as the City of the Dead, to make way for a new highway.48
Some burial plots were cleared without families’ knowledge, much less consent. 49

Although not all of the above-mentioned measures can be grouped in the same category,
they should be taken together and understood as part of a unique period of governance in
the history of the country emblematic of a carceral moment, in which there is perpetual
construction/destruction without restraint or regard for citizens. That is, it is becoming
increasingly evident that there is no longer any kind of room for tension with anything
(place) or anyone not on board with the plans of the carceral State, and nowhere to contain
the latter except prison. Perhaps an awareness of this on part of the State has led to
noticeable development of prison construction across the country, in terms of both the
number of new buildings and their enhanced capacity and surveillance standards.50
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These expanding carceral practices of the State are met with as much criticism and
opposition as is possible from families of those affected as well as activists across the
political spectrum. A collective frustration directed at issues such as the mistreatment of
prisoner rights is evident in, for example, numerous (but short-lived) social media
campaigns.51 An important example is the We Record platform working to document
violations committed against prisoners and cases of enforced disappearance. 52 At the same
time, whether it can be said that there is outright opposition to the prison system is difficult.
This is because of a marked absence of opposition to the prison as such, with most of the
criticism appearing to be exclusive to political prisoners or the conditions under which
prisoners are kept.

In those (important) critiques, the idea of the prison as such is not exactly the problem;
unjust imprisonment is. In this regard, other categories of ‘criminals’ are unaccounted for
in the conversation about prisons. While valuable, the available critiques (why they are the
only ones available will be explored in later chapters) speak to how what could be
described as carceral sensibilities continue to dominate among anti-state activism, with
activists continuing to draw on tools of the State as a means of achieving justice. The
following chapter explores this paradoxical entanglement in the case of actors working to
respond to violence against women in particular,53 and questions whether it is paradoxical
at all in relation to the context in which it takes place.
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53
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III.

‘Once You Win, You Are the State’54
‘Without community there is no liberation, only the most vulnerable and temporary
armistice between an individual and her oppression. But community must not mean
a shedding of our differences, nor the pathetic pretense that these differences do
not exist. Those of us who stand outside the circle of this society's definition of
acceptable women; those of us who have been forged in the crucibles of difference
– those of us who are poor, who are lesbians, who are Black, who are older – know
that survival is not an academic skill. It is learning how to take our differences and
make them strengths. For the master's tools will never dismantle the master's
house’.55
— Audre Lorde, 1984

In her 1984 speech at the New York University Institute for the Humanities conference,
Audre Lorde challenges the idea of the (racist and patriarchal) institution of the university
as a source of radical change through its advocacy of ‘tolerance’ as a tool for genuine
progress. She questions whether the tools of a racist patriarchy could be used in good faith
to examine ‘the fruits of that same patriarchy’, and leaves her audience with the oftenquoted statement, ‘the master's tools will never dismantle the master's house’.56 About ten
years later, critical race scholar Trina Grillo expands on the significance of Lorde’s
statement in her essay, ‘Anti-Essentialism and Intersectionality: Tools to Dismantle the
Master's House’, highlighting how sometimes, ‘the governing paradigms which have
structured all of our lives are so powerful that we can think we are doing progressive work,
dismantling the structures of racism and other oppressions, when in fact we are reinforcing
the paradigms’.57
This chapter takes a look at some of the ways in which the women’s movement in Egypt
finds itself in similarly paradoxical entanglements with the carceral politics of the state in
its advocacy. It explores how activists continue to draw on tools of the State as a means
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of achieving justice – identified in the chapter as an outcome of carceral feminism – despite
often being on the other end of those tools themselves. First, a quick sketch of said
women’s movement and what remains of it before and after the crackdowns of 2013.

A. Which Feminist Activism?
Feminist activity in Egypt is often described as having had an awakening following the
2011 uprisings, but feminist organizations had existed and were active long before then.
Civil society feminism, as Hala Kamal calls it, is estimated to have taken place between
the 1980s and 2011.58 Described as the ‘third wave’ of the local feminist movement, civil
society feminism was facilitated by changes in the law of association, which allowed for
the establishment of a number of feminist organizations, including the New Woman
Foundation, Center of Egyptian Women’s Legal Assistance (CEWLA), and Nazra for
Feminist Studies.59 These organizations were established and registered as legal entities
with recognition from the government, and it was during this period that they built on work
relating a number of issues, including but not limited to reproductive rights, domestic
violence, and female genital mutilation (FGM).60

Of course, the 25 January 2011 uprising did provide a brief window of time where these
organizations became increasingly active. This activity was made possible after the ‘preRevolutionary corporatist political environment, marked by fluctuations in state repression
and inclusion of oppositional forces in the political process, was temporarily disrupted by
the ensuing political instability of the Revolution’. 61 Sister initiatives were quickly set up,
most notably Shoft Taharrush, Tahrir Bodyguard, and Operation Anti-Sexual Harassment
(OpAntiSH).62 As one could tell from their names, these initiatives emerged out of an
urgent need to respond to sexual violence experienced by women in the public sphere
(where they rapidly featured more frequently in light of popular demonstrations and sitHala Kamal, A Century of Egyptian Women’s Demands: The Four Waves of the Egyptian Feminist
Movement, in ‘Gender and Race Matter: Global Perspectives on Being a Woman’ 3-22, 11 Adv in Gender
Res 21 (2016).
59
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60
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61
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ins).63 Perhaps owing to that specificity and urgency, these initiatives eventually ‘found it
difficult to translate their work to non-Revolutionary protest settings and other forms of
non-protest related activism’. 64
Today, the state of feminist activism65 (i.e. what is allowed/what remains of it) in Egypt is
what one could expect under the authoritarian context explored in the first chapter and
particularly after the violent ousting of Morsi in 2013. In that context, most of these
organizations were forced to gradually cease operations. What could be described as a
lively and promising feminist presence in the immediate aftermath of 2011 today boils
down to very few human and women’s rights organizations whose activities are limited
and mostly focused on knowledge production and legal assistance. 66 Individuals leading
or affiliated with said organizations continue to be targeted by the regime today. For
example, in 2016, Nazra for Feminist Studies, was the target of an investigation launched
by the regime accusing multiple similar NGOs (critical of the government) of ‘receiving
foreign funds for activities that are a threat to national security’. 67 Mozn Hassan, the
director of the center, has been banned from travelling since. 68 Similarly, CEWLA was a
target of the same investigation – its founder, feminist lawyer and activist Azza Soliman,
has also since been banned from travelling, with an assets freeze effective on both her and
Hassan.69 Both organizations, as well as many others, have had to cut staff and decrease
activities dramatically in an effort to continue operating in the country (others, such as the
Cairo Institute of Human Rights Studies, have had to relocate entirely). 70
Kamal, supra note 58, at 14. Kamal notes that Egyptian women’s participation in the revolution should
not be viewed as exceptional, having played a role in anti-colonial struggles during the 1919 Revolution.
64
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Clearly, the remaining feminist organizations or collectives have suffered greatly at the
hands of the Egyptian justice system. They have experienced first-hand how incompetent
and corrupt that system is. It is precisely this struggle between the surviving feminist actors
and the State that makes the continued resort of the former to the latter worth examining.
It should be said that other NGOs not centered around the status of women do not
necessarily behave differently (and perhaps this behavior can be generalized to include the
rest of society). However, the choice is made to look particularly at feminist activism
because of its position as a source of radical politics. This is owed to past and present
stances by feminists against the oppressive politics of the State, including police brutality
and torture in prisons.71 The continued resort of remaining local feminist activism today to
state-sanctioned methods of justice for violence against women can be understood as an
effect of what is described as carceral feminism.

B. Carceral Feminism
Carceral feminism is a name first given by sociologist Elizabeth Bernstein in 2007 to a
specific brand of feminism which pushes for law-and-order approaches to achieve gender
justice.72 It describes a phenomenon in which mainstream feminist scholars and activists
view ‘increased conviction rates and longer sentences as a political goal—or, at the very
least, are willing to collaborate with police and lament cases where perpetrators of sexual
violence are given “light” or non-custodial sentences’.73 To explain this, Bernstein writes
specifically about the way in which ‘feminism shifted in the past decades from a focus on
economic justice and liberation to the model of “feminism-as-crime-control”’.74
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This model identified by Bernstein is thought to have first emerged in the United States
during the rise of neoliberalism and the waning of the welfare state during the mid-1970s,
which recalibrated crime as the new ‘centerpiece of public discourse and also became a
coded language for talking about race’. 75 With this recalibration and amid calls for
increased intervention from the criminal justice system, gender violence was no longer
viewed as the outcome of specific political and social configurations, and was instead
simply defined as ‘crime’. 76 For (predominantly white) feminist activists at the time, this
shift presented an opportunity for gaining legitimacy for the movement: by the 1980s and
1990s, radical feminist lawyers and activists were working with law enforcement for
increased measures of criminalization with regard to violence against women (VAW).77

This joining of arms in the legal realm should not be viewed as an isolated event but as
one which is emblematic of the liberal reformism of the American radical feminist praxis
at the time, sustained by a parallel shift in theory. 78 Anthropologist Susan Watkins writes
of this praxis and its evolution throughout different administrations over the last three
decades of the 20th century: ‘As the American economy was transformed...monetarist
austerity, union-bashing, shareholder agendas, off-shored manufacturing, deregulated
finance, subprime debt—mainstream feminists’ response was simply to demand a larger
stake within it’.79 This pattern was also able to find its way with the help of international
financial institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), both of which accounted for liberal feminism in gender-mainstreaming and
structural adjustment programs (SAPs) (most visible, for example, in the push for womentargeted microfinancing in the global South).80

In fact, perhaps the carceral turn should be understood as a phenomenon stemming from
such institutions pressuring global South governments to, as Julia Sudbury describes it,
75
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‘reign in spending on health, housing, clean water, and other basic necessities...[and]
embark on a U.S.-style...law-and-order buildup’.81 She particularly looks at endeavors by
the Inter-American Development Bank in the early 2000s to promote the modernization of
Latin American and Caribbean justice systems. In so doing, the Bank ‘spent over $460
million in criminal justice loans and technical assistance in 21 countries’.82 It is Sudbury’s
analysis that ‘the Bank's interest in justice reform is driven in part by corporate executives,
who...are concerned that struggling criminal justice systems in the region, “present a major
problem for their business operations”’.83 Sudbury’s example of the Inter-American
Development Bank should reflect nothing out of the ordinary for neoliberalism, a system
that is understood to be continually ‘imposed through a hitherto unparalleled level of
orchestration between multinational corporations, intergovernmental organizations, and
states’.84

Anti-carceral feminism arguments are abundant and often overlap with each other. Writing
about the long history and influence of women's groups and feminists in the United States
on issues related to crime, punishment, law and order, Marie Gottschalk goes so far as to
say that the ‘contemporary women's movement in the United States helped facilitate the
carceral state’.85 Informed by Black feminism, prison abolitionists in the United States are
vocal about the country’s growing prison-industrial complex and argue towards a rejection
of ‘punitive, retributive and carceral logics’, as well as of the ‘idea that punishment
logically follows from crime - even in cases of violent crimes against women’.86 Similarly,
Marxist critiques of carceral feminism lament how it ‘makes the mistaken assumption that
the laws, police, and courts maintain sufficient autonomy from the capitalist power

81

Julia Sudbury, A World Without Prisons: Resisting Militarism, Globalized Punishment, and Empire, 31
Soc Justice 9-30, 14 (2004).
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Zeynep Gambetti and Marcial Godoy-Anativia, States of (In)security: Coming to Terms with an Erratic
Terrain in ‘Rhetorics of Security: Belonging and Violence in the Neoliberal Era’ 5 (New York: NYU
Press) 2013.
85
Marie Gottschalk, ‘The Prison and the Gallows’ 115 (New York: Cambridge University Press) 2006.
86
Amy Masson, A Critique of Anti-Carceral Feminism, 21(3) J Int Women's Stud 64-76, 66 (2020);
Angela Davis, ‘Are Prisons Obsolete?’ (Seven Stories Press) 2003.

18

structure to counter its deep-seated tendency to generate gender violence’, recognizing
carceral feminism as closely related to corporate feminism. 87

Significantly, carceral feminism as it developed in the United States is unique: it is
understood to be the result of an alliance between the state and liberal-reformed radical
feminists. It cannot be generalized to even other countries in the West: Gottschalk notes
how the earlier feminist movement in the UK was careful not to concede certain struggles
to the state in its fight against domestic violence (mainstream feminists in the United States
did not exercise the same restraint).88 Still, the carceral turn of feminism in the 90s was
hardly contained in the United States; carceral feminism ‘developed global reach by
traveling the highways of international human rights advocacy’. 89 Through international
NGOs, UN agencies and conferences, it spilled into other places as well.
To understand this ‘spill’, it is perhaps useful to explore what gender and development
scholar Islah Jad terms ‘NGO-ization’, or how activism in Arab countries came to be
determined and shaped by the phenomenon of NGO-building. She describes the historical
backdrop against which this took place as linked to global schemes for development which
‘have their roots in the SAPs implemented by the World Bank and the IMF in many Third
World Countries (including some of the Arab countries), from the late ‘70s through the
‘80s, typically involving a variety of reforms in monetary, fiscal, trade, regulatory policies,
and public sector management’. 90 Noting the significant role played by the United States
in this process, Jad writes that the ‘worldwide promotion of democracy and “civil society”
discourse was closely tied to anti-communism in the Reagan years, but was given greater
emphasis by George Bush senior, and then Clinton, with the end of the Cold War...Much
of this is channeled through NGOs and specialist foundations, but with the increase in
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official funding for democracy promotion, USAID is becoming increasingly involved in
such initiatives’.91 These initiatives are, naturally, influenced by the currents of feminist
advocacy at home (which, as demonstrated earlier, are carceral in nature). Arundhati Roy
similarly describes NGO-ization as an anaesthetizing process, which ‘begins to dictate the
agenda. It turns confrontation into negotiation. It depoliticizes resistance’.92

Both Jad and Roy describe a phenomenon in which anti-state activism is replaced with a
docile, project-oriented NGO-building process. This defeat of sorts is understood to have
paved the way for new criminalizing discourses, ushered in an era of gender-specific
legalist initiatives with regressive consequences, and ultimately, increased policing and
incarceration. It must be noted that the process of NGO-ization and the related emergence
of carceral feminism (from the Western feminist movement more broadly) is not cited here
as the singular reason behind shortcomings in the political aspiration of the Egyptian
feminist movement. But these shortcomings do not happen in isolation from these
processes either; they happen at the ‘contentious intersection of regional, subaltern and UN
system forms of feminist mobilization’.93 It is therefore important to refer to them in order
to point out a particular sequence of events which could have played a role in shaping the
contours of said movement. Consequently, what follows is not intended to be a mapping
of articulations of carceral feminism in Egypt. It is instead an attempt to highlight the
pervasiveness of carceral logics in Egyptian feminism, and the lack of space available for
alternative possibilities.

Paul Amar writes about how the direction of UN policy consensus and the practice of its
government and NGO allies moved away from war and macroeconomic development
toward daily life and morality: ‘we have witnessed a move in internationalist feminism
toward a public space and social deviance model (or ‘urban vice’ model) concerned with
enforcing access to public space, reforming public masculinities and moralizing and
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desexualizing urban quality of life’.94 Noting the protest-charged climate of the early
2000s, he explains how (anti-state) demonstrators were demonized by the state as crazed
mobs of brutal men, in line with Orientalist figurations of the savage and hypermasculine
‘Arab street’, discursively transforming successful political demonstrations into chaotic
mobs. 95

In an attempt to counter this conception of the hypermasculine Arab-street, some
organizations realized that placing upper-middle class women in mass protests could play
a crucial symbolic role in discrediting the ‘hyper-mob’ performances, which relied heavily
on the ‘colonial metaphors attached to the bodies of brutal working-class men’.96 Backlash
against this tactic came quickly, and from ‘internationally-linked anti-harassment NGOs
in Egypt who deployed a more...law enforcement-centered rescue–protection
framework’.97 To explain this framework in action, Amar describes the response by these
NGOs to violent sexual attacks during Eid celebrations in 2008 (a common occurrence that
often took place with the police’s consent and encouragement), which largely turned a
blind eye to the complicit and facilitatory state apparatus, and displaced outrage onto
working-class masculinity instead. 98

To certain feminist actors, the state was capable of simultaneously performing the tasks of
subjugation and liberation, without this presenting any contradiction. Highlighting the role
of the Egyptian Center for Women’s Rights in particular – which drew ‘directly on UN
gender doctrines and CEDAW institutions, funds, discourses’ and was the recipient of
support for its projects from international donor agencies including international NGOs
and the World Bank – Amar writes that the organization demanded the passage of new
laws that mandated much higher sentences (up to ten years) and higher fines for sexual
harassment.99
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Amar doesn’t refer directly to the term carceral feminism and doesn’t have to; his analysis
describes an outcome that is textbook-carceral feminism: ‘once it became apparent that
civil society organizations were ignoring the role of the police and the security state in the
generation of sexualized violence, the interior and security establishments jumped on
board and embraced the anti-harassment campaign enthusiastically’. 100 In a crackdown on
sexual harassment in 2008, police forces arrested an estimated 400 boys in Cairo,
reportedly aged between 15 and 17 years old: ‘the sexual harassment controversy that had
begun as a thorough critique of repressive policing and the torture of dissident women and
youth had been appropriated by the security state and NGO establishment as justification
for extending police brutality, mass arrests, social cleansing of the city and the necessity
of the emergency decree’. 101
By sparing the state’s encouragement (and often use) of sexual violence of any criticism,
the ECWR capitalizes, whether wittingly or not, on the moment, and instead demands
‘increased interventions by the brutal security state to protect women in public’. 102 The
counterproductivity of this carceral approach is captured in Mariz Tadros’s view that
‘while socially motivated and politically motivated sexual harassment may be distinct
aspects of sexual harassment, they are similar, overlapping, and mutually reinforcing
expressions of discriminatory gendered norms that disadvantage women in the public
space’.103 Entanglements such as this one are captured in the work of Mimi Kim, in which
she writes about the paradoxical way in which social movement victors could be
transformed into unwitting agents of the state. She quotes critical legal theorists Wendy
Brown and Janet Halley when she notes, ‘once you win, you are the state’.104
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An avoidance of this dilemma altogether can be observed in the not-so-subtly carceral
campaign, al-mutaharrish mujrim (the harasser is a criminal). Al-mutaharrish mujrim was
launched in 2015 by crowd-mapping platform HarassMap, one of the anti-sexual
harassment initiatives founded in the days preceding the 2011 uprising. The media
campaign, which included TV commercials, was premised on the idea of bystander
intervention. Angie Abdelmonem analyzes the framing of the campaign, writing about
how it ‘conveys a neoliberal vision of the possibilities for effecting individual selfdiscipline to produce new subjective and intersubjective responses to sexual
harassment’,105 and arguing that it contains both carceral and anti-carceral currents in its
rhetoric.
A total of three commercials are described by Abdelmonem in detail: ‘In the first campaign
commercial, a narrator reads the text of the new sexual harassment law, Article 306
established by presidential decree in 2014, against the image of a handcuffed man sitting
in a police van, while a red police light flashes and a siren sounds in the background.
Commercial two shows bystanders watching while a woman is harassed after entering a
city bus. A man stands close and fondles the edge of her hijab before she turns to stare the
harasser down. A narrator notes the frequency of sexual harassment on transportation and
how no one intervenes to stop it. The video ends with bystanders watching police take
away the harasser’.106
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Source: HarassMap, YouTube channel (2015)107
Although, earlier on in the argument, it is acknowledged as a concern that bystander
intervention ‘reproduces penal power by expanding surveillance, where bystanders are
responsible for reporting to police or authority figures’, the conclusion remains that the
campaign has a dual nature of being anti-carceral (‘in its focus on reshaping community
norms and practice as the solution to Egypt’s sexual harassment problem’) and also
carceral (‘in its reliance on the law and threat of arrest to mobilize people to act’).108 This
dualism is presumably owed to the campaign’s lack of emphasis on the resort to police
power, aiming instead to ‘cultivate new ethical dispositions’. But the cultivation of said
ethical dispositions is still carried out through carceral means: Abdelmonem notes that the
end-goal is for bystanders to police their own behavior, linking this to ‘neoliberal efforts
at creating a new kind of citizen’.109 Yet, even if the objective is to advocate self-policing,
the visible and recurrent threat of arrest and prison utilized by the campaign are explicitly
carceral in nature.

107

Screenshot of al-mutaharrish mujrim video campaign, showing the character of the harasser being taken
away in the back of a police car. The words on the screen read, ‘harassment is [an offense/crime]
punishable by imprisonment’.
108
Id. at 12.
109
Id. at 10.

24

Despite its skepticism towards the police enforcement and state reform, HarassMap still
‘operates within a transnational framework shaped by decades of governance feminist
activism, in which reforming state/legal institutions to criminalize sexual violence and
prosecute offenders is essential for local human rights implementation’.110 Although aware
of the police as a source of sexual harassment, by choosing to (visually, symbolically)
include the police in its campaign, HarassMap chooses to avoid this paradox altogether,
with the objective of achieving bottom-up change in police and state practices.
To quickly revisit Malek Adly’s Facebook story from earlier: if the ECWR did not, as
Amar puts it, connect the dots (between sexual harassment and the state’s policy of
assaulting women) and HarassMap avoids the dots altogether (by choosing to disengage
from the question of the efficacy of a law-and-order approach), Adly makes a choice to
accept the dilemma anyway. El-Ashmawy’s role as both oppressor and savior creates no
apparent contradiction for Adly. He later clarified in a different post that because he is a
‘lawyer and not a freedom fighter...when I witness any of the authorities doing something
I hoped for, I will talk about it and thank them...in the hopes that it might trigger some
progress...[these] things are not personal for me’.111 In this incident and the posts it later
generated, the idea of the master’s tools is made more complicated.
In his clarification, Adly makes repeated references to ‘current times,’ times where things
are increasingly muddled, spaces are confined, and loyalties complicated – times where
there seems to be no baseline, where any apparent return to the baseline should be met with
gratitude. These times should be considered constitutive of what was referred to in the
previous chapter as the carceral moment. Confined within this moment (sometimes
literally), it is not difficult to understand what drives Egyptian feminist organizations or
collectives to carceral methods of justice today, being in an unenviable position of having
no alternative course of action. As mentioned earlier, this thesis is not concerned so much
with pointing out manifestations of carceral feminism as it is with pointing out an absence
of (space for) thought about alternative approaches to justice. For this reason, the aim of
110
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the following chapter is to explain the cause of the absence of anti-carceral feminist
thought in local activism, by looking at primarily two factors: first, the genealogy of
abolition as it originates in North America, and second, the continuous state of emergency
imposed in Egypt since mid-20th century.
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IV.

The Absence of Anti-Carceral Feminism
‘Sylvia Wynter talks about reservation—which is also an accurate name for our
contemporary culture—meaning that at the same moment indigenous people are
confined to reservations by the state, our imaginations are also confined. All of us.
And, I would also say that the moments in which prisons became a dominant feature
of the U.S., our imaginations (for all, not just those of us disproportionately
imprisoned) also became imprisoned. The way we imagine work, our relationships,
the future, family, everything, is locked down’.112
— Alexis Pauline Gumbs, 2017

So far, I have explored both the exceptionally arbitrary and disturbing conditions of living
in the Egyptian carceral state and the way it has been unyielding in its targeting of feminist
and other dissenting actors in Egypt. I have also explored some of the ways in which these
surviving actors continue to rely on the carceral state to achieve justice. It is the aim of this
chapter to examine the reasons behind this continued dependence. In other words, how to
explain the apparent absence of alternative forms of justice in existing local feminist
thought? This chapter offers a reading in which the genealogy of abolition (as it originates
in North America), as well the continued state of emergency in Egypt, can help answer the
question.

A. Abolitionist Feminism
It was acknowledged earlier that a major source of the critique of carceral feminism comes
from the tradition of prison abolitionist feminism.113 This tradition finds its roots in the
United States, and particularly in the work of Black activists and scholars struggling and
theorizing against the racist and sexist carceral state. Perhaps most prominently, and
throughout her life, Angela Davis has weaved together a detailed history of the American
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prison system (of which she herself is a survivor), from its racist origins as the slave
penitentiary, to its modern-day iteration as the (global) prison-industrial complex.114 In the
same vein, abolitionist Dylan Rodriguez understands what he describes as state regimes of
criminalization (criminal justice) and incarceration in the US as seated within a ‘longer
national tradition of anti-Black nation-building and racist statecraft’.115

More directly tackling the tensions between carceral and abolitionist feminism, Emily
Thuma details the history of grassroots resistance to the carceral state in 1970s America.
In her account, the politics of these grassroots movements was antithetical to the strategies
deployed by the mainstream women’s movement, which primarily centered the resort to
the criminal legal system as a solution to sexual and domestic violence: ‘the abolitionist
feminist organizing that Thuma details fundamentally counters the logics and practices of
“carceral feminism” — the strand of feminist politics contending that the best strategy for
remedying sexual violence and other forms of interpersonal gender violence is through
increasing punitive state power’.116

The demand put forward by prison abolitionists is clear: the abolition of the prison as the
dominant mode of punishment for gender crimes. In it, they are joined by a number of
Black and other feminist organizers and thinkers.117 Significantly, Davis tackles the
question of what to expect after abolition – ‘if jails and prisons are to be abolished, then
what will replace them?’.118 She reveals that there is no singular answer: ‘an abolitionist
approach,’ Davis writes, ‘...would require us to imagine a constellation of alternative
strategies and institutions, with the ultimate aim of removing the prison from the social
and ideological landscapes of our society’.119 For Rodriguez, too, abolition is necessarily
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‘a totality of collective cultural, organizing, artistic, (self-defensive) paramilitary,
educational, community-building, and decolonial practices’.120

Similarly, Lena Palacios highlights the effort made by the grassroots organization CR10
Publications Collective to emphasize how prison abolition is ‘not simply about tearing
down prison walls, but...about building alternative formations that actually protect people
from violence, that crowd out the criminalization regime’.121 In fact, this focus on building
the future in parallel with destruction of the carceral state is central to the abolitionist
project in the US. That is, what is envisioned is not simply a world without prisons, but
also ‘the construction of democratic institutions that could create substantive equality and
extend the conditions for flourishing to all’. 122 For example, Anna Terweil notes how
abolitionist organizations, in critiquing carceral feminism, ‘challenge social justice
movements to develop community-based responses to violence that do not rely on the
criminal justice system and which have mechanisms that ensure safety and accountability
for survivors of sexual and domestic violence’.123 According to Terweil, these movements
demonstrate how anti-carceral feminism ‘does not merely require divesting from punitive
state practices,’ but rather also investing into collective governance or a reimagined
welfare state.124 In so doing, abolitionist feminism embarks on a long term project of
‘transforming communities to decrease the perceived need for prisons’.125

What we see here is an anti-carceral feminism which could be identified as fundamentally
American, inasmuch as it operates against the backdrop of a history of slavery and a
globally unmatched prison industrial complex in the United States.126 It follows that the
roadmap to abolition identified by the above-mentioned activists and scholars is also
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American, responding to a democratic context in which movements, for the most part, are
not forced to grapple with hallmarks of authoritarianism, such as the enforcement of a
never-ending state of emergency. This history of prison abolition as a theory and demand
is significant to acknowledge. On the theoretical level, as Sara Salem writes about the
attempts to reformulate the genealogy of intersectionality, ‘claims about beginnings are
claims to power’.127 Tracing the way in which intersectionality (a concept grounded in
Black feminism) found its way into more mainstream approaches to feminism, Salem
shows how theory changes as it travels, demonstrating how that process can sometimes
eventually ‘render the concept devoid of its original meanings’.128 Indeed, as Salem points
out, many rightly argue that intersectionality has fully experienced a process of
‘appropriation within neoliberal feminist academia’129 – one only has to look at
contemporary scholarly works which (ab)use intersectionality as a framework in
connection with inherently racist and contradictory agendas.130

At the same time, the methods used by the abolitionist movement in the United States to
achieve its objectives were designed to cater to a democratic context. As I argue in the
following section, these methods include, least of all, the ability to outwardly reject state
mechanisms for justice. This very ability is today criminalized in Egypt, as demonstrated
in earlier sections. Bearing these intricacies in mind, it becomes clear that to translate
prison abolition into a different context would be a problematic and, even worse,
counterproductive exercise. Instead, the goal is to stay true to the genealogy, purpose and
struggle of abolition as a theory and practice. Rather than call for an ‘application’ of
abolition, it is my intention to learn from the essence of the movement: the recognition that
state justice produces injustice, and that a different kind of justice is possible.
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B. Intermission: Thinking through Politics of Location
First used in a speech given by Adrienne Rich in 1986, a politics of location emerged as a
refusal of hegemonic understandings of feminism and a tool for deconstructing whiteness.
The term has since been used in anti-imperialist and anti-racist feminist critique, and
stretched to include within it different political formulations. Ritty Lukose quotes
postcolonial feminist Mary John, who notes the constitutive role played by locations in
‘structuring the frames of reference within which we develop our projects...this includes
our institutional and disciplinary affiliations, the milieu of intellectual debate, the
‘background practices’ and grain of everyday life’.131
For John, intellectual production ‘could be described as an interplay between what
becomes a problem for thought and what is allowed to go without saying’.132 This
interplay, she writes, is informed by one’s location: ‘the site of one’s questions and
interventions, the place of accountability’.133 Location, as used in this context, does not
refer to identity designations such as the usual race, sex, or class, but rather ‘the context of
power and knowledge that shapes the intersection of our political and intellectual
projects’.134 The following section should be read as an attempt at thinking through this
paradigm, taking locality and ‘home’ as the site where politics are constituted. 135

As outlined earlier, prison abolition is a project constituted by the rejection of the
(American) carceral state, rejection that is contingent on imagining and working towards
building alternatives to said state – institutions which eschew the need to resort to state
regimes of criminalization (to borrow Rodriguez’s terminology). Such institutions are
often the result of grassroots and community efforts, and are imagined to be democratic
and welfare-centered in nature. This section examines how, when the space to imagine or
build alternatives to the existing system is itself subject to criminalization (which, as will
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be demonstrated below, is indeed the case in the context of Egypt), resort to state
machinery becomes inevitable.

Such space (or lack thereof) is the product of a robust legal architecture that is constitutive
of the modern Egyptian state. It is not unrealistic to describe all the markers of repression
identified in earlier chapters – the crackdown on both the political and apolitical
represented in the repression of syndicates, policing of public space, and detention of
TikTok influencers – as enabled and empowered by this architecture, at the heart of which
we find emergency law.

C. Emergency Law
Emergency law in Egypt is a direct legacy of the British occupation from 1882 to 1952.
The law was repeatedly invoked by the occupying power in times of emergency (read:
political upheaval), thus allowing Britain to ‘police the country and mobilize its resources,
unencumbered by political restrictions, judicial oversight or international diplomacy’. 136
Indeed, declarations of the law meant that the British could rely on emergency powers to
‘impose new taxes on the many non-British foreigners’ residing in the country at the
time.137
However, even after gaining independence in 1952, the Free Officers (under the leadership
of Gamal Abdel-Nasser) continued to make use of the law, reimposing it in 1956 during
the Suez War, as well as in 1958 during the brief union with Syria.138 The 1958 emergency
law in particular ‘authorizes the president to declare a state of emergency ‘whenever public
security or order are threatened’.139 As noted by Nora Taha and Assem Khalil, the law’s
use of the nebulous ‘public order’ allows for virtually any situation to legitimate an
invocation of the law.140
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This continuum between the British occupation and the Egyptian regime’s use of
emergency powers outlived the rule of Anwar El Sadat, Hosni Mubarak, and even the
democratically-elected Mohamed Morsi, with routine renewals of the law taking place
every 24 months.141 Mubarak would last renew the law in 2010: ‘Before the January 25,
2011 Revolution, the state of emergency had already been in force since 1981 and had
been renewed by the president every two years. The last decree issued by President
Mubarak to reinstate the state of emergency was resolution No. 126/2010. According to
this resolution, the state of emergency ended on May 31, 2012’.142
If under Abdel-Nasser and El Sadat, emergency powers were justified by postindependence instability and war respectively; under Mubarak, by the promise of
economic growth and stability; and under Morsi, by an effort to maintain political
legitimacy – under El Sisi, they are perhaps justified by a hybrid of all of the above plus
security. As such, under the current regime, the continuum is fortified with additional
presidential powers to ‘combat terrorism’.143
The current iteration of the law also frees the president from the need to resort to (in any
case, merely aesthetic) approvals from parliament, allowing him instead to issue the
declaration himself.144 If, under Mubarak’s emergency rule, the country’s judiciary had
‘often provided a check on presidential exercises of emergency powers’,145 under El Sisi,
the judiciary has been subsumed into the regime, meaning no checks or balances. It is
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under this ‘open air prison’146 that Egyptian activists, academics, or the general population,
work, think and live, and it is not something that American organizers (a term designating
crime under emergency law) need to grapple with in their work towards abolition.
This is, of course, not to say that these organizers experience fewer threats or struggles in
their work. There is no doubt that prison abolitionists still live in societies marked by police
brutality and racism. The goal here is not to participate in the oppression Olympics – rather,
it is to say that the nature of struggles is unique, as it always is. Because of this, ‘abolition’
as understood in the United States is simply unattainable under the emergency lawpowered authoritarianism under which Egyptians live. This is in part due to the way in
which the political goals and imaginary of these collectives are also held hostage. As Taha
and Khalil point out in respect to the persistence of emergency powers, ‘[authorities] are
not the only ones who get used to the new normalcy...Such normalization also carries with
it a tranquilizing effect on the public’s critical approach toward emergency regimes’.147
And so, as long as emergency law remains in effect (a law which forms, as demonstrated
by Reza, the very foundations upon which the modern Egyptian state was built), it is simply
not possible to carry out the necessary parallel work to abolition (as theorized from the
US). This work includes the building of alternative spaces, of coalitions, of communities,
and it is alongside this work that it becomes possible to begin to think about not resorting
to carceral justice. That is, without first creating the conditions necessary for doing away
with said justice, abolition is impossible.

To help me think through some of the ideas or themes explored in this thesis and to get a
sense of what the ‘the public’s critical approach’ looked like, I set out to interview
Egyptian feminist activists who, given their exposure and experience, could have grappled
with questions similar to the ones posed by this research. Their conclusion was similar:
without a ‘crack’ in the state’s seemingly impenetrable power, change will remain
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unlikely. The following chapter, with the help of three interviewees, examines conditions
under which such change is possible, or had been possible in the past.
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V.

Beyond the Basha’s Tools
‘The system puts your back against the wall, so that the only way you can protect
yourself and guarantee a minimum amount of safety is by using the tools created
by the system, and you can only use these tools individually, because the whole
system is built on preventing us from acting collectively. So an incident happens
to you, because of the system, and you’re left with no other choice than to use the
tools of this system, not because they are the only ones that work but because the
system does not allow for other ones to exist.’148
–

Salma El Tarzi, 2020

A. Revisiting OpAntiSH vs. HarassMap
As briefly stated earlier on, the 2011 uprising saw a number of groups form in an attempt
to respond to the now infamous incidents of mass sexual assault taking place at
demonstrations.149 Operation Anti-Sexual Harassment (OpAntiSH) was one such group
made up of activists and volunteers focused on direct intervention particularly in
downtown Cairo. Their approach can be described as victim-centric, concerned with the
rescue and recovery of the victims150 rather than pursuing formal channels of justice.
According to one former member of the group, this approach was the result of an active
decision informed by the members’ pre-existing ‘anarchist or militant feminist politics’.151

This position was also certainly not one which was mainstream, but which existed at a time
where debates proliferated among similar groups with respect to response mechanisms.
For example, groups grappled with questions such as whether or not it should be a priority
to punish the assailant(s), whether that should be done through physical or other
148
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violence,152 or whether or not it made sense in a politically volatile context to lock the
assailant(s) up. Another former member of OpAntiSH recalls more pragmatic
considerations taking place: ‘bringing the police into the Square’, during the height of antipolice sentiments in the revolutionary space, would have subjected the group to criticism
at best and exile or violence at worst.153
Ultimately, there is still something to say about the evident and somewhat explicitly
anticarceral motivations of OpAntiSH. Members of the group actively ‘challenged the
stereotypical role of security forces’, pointing out how ‘in the absence of any police
restructuring or any reforms of the legal system concerning sexual violence, handing
assaulters to the police and the regime – that is [itself] involved in the sexual violence acts
– remains questionable’.154 Contrast this political imaginary with that of the more carceralleaning, less-ambitious HarassMap. Since 2010, the initiative has used crowdsourced data
to host an interactive online platform for reporting and mapping incidents of sexual
harassment across the country. This mapping process is used to reflect hotspots on the map,
where incidents of sexual harassment are indicated to be higher in numbers. HarassMap’s
website (at the time of writing) encourages users to report incidents using the platform:
‘the individual reports show the reality and scope of sexual harassment and assault in
Egypt’.155
Arguing that the platform is used to ‘produce a particular biopolitical configuration of the
Egyptian street’, Nicole Grove notes how, in aggregating data about sexual violence, the
map ‘creates the conditions of possibility for forms of population management’, which is
accomplished through the ‘“targeting” of dangerous people, dangerous streets, and
dangerous neighborhoods’.156 Following Paul Amar’s analysis of specific feminist NGOs
in Egypt, Grove situates HarassMap within a particular system of UN-recognized feminist
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campaigns which ‘rejected class-conscious movements for social change and instead
focused on cultural explanations for gendered sexual violence’.157
HarassMap cleary falls short in its reliance on criminalization tactics, but OpAntiSH is not
inserted here nostalgically or as a winning model: as former members of the collective
have noted, it emerged from and for a specifically volatile context. Rather, it is perhaps a
helpful reminder that alternative ways of thinking about justice was almost realized as a
project, at a time when there was a crack in the emergency system. That is, it is not a
coincidence that OpAntiSH’s activities (and the productive conversations which flowed
from these activities) emerged in a context where the long-imposed state of emergency
was suddenly disrupted.

Bearing this moment of disruption in mind, the radical task at hand appears to be imagining
a life beyond the state of emergency. What this translates into in reality is perhaps
redirecting efforts focused on enhancing the effectiveness of the legal system inwards and
focusing on manageable communities that can affect change without resort to the carceral
state. At a time when the emergency state seems more invincible than ever, thinking about
alternative justice can be driven partly by the limited choices survivors of sexual violence
have to pick from to achieve justice.

B. Towards Non-Carceral Justice
Dina Makram-Ebeid writes about these limitations in light of accusations of sexual assault
brought against two members of the (socialist) Bread and Freedom Party by a woman
engaged in the field of civil society. One of those members is Khaled Ali, who, at the time,
was the leftist candidate for the 2018 presidential race. 158 Makram-Ebeid particularly
points out how discussions surrounding the case greatly emphasized the absence of noncarceral, ‘community mechanisms for pursuing justice in cases of sexual violence, beyond
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the criminal justice system’. 159 This absence was particularly notable because of the
victim’s refusal to resort to legal measures, in order to ‘protect her mental wellbeing’. 160
What took place instead was an internal investigative committee led by independent
individuals from the community.161
Several months later, the committee released a report riddled with terminology borrowed
from legal proceedings: rather than ‘addressing the difficulty of conducting communitybased justice’,162 the report emphasized ‘the human rights declaration and the Egyptian
Civil Law language to refer to the rights of the “plaintiff, defenders, and witnesses,”
asserting that the “defendant is innocent until proven guilty”’.163 As Samaa Elturkey
describes it, the process was ‘handcuffed by its reliance on legal references’.164 Attempting
to envision a non-carceral form of justice, Elturkey imagines how transformative justice
would play out in the Egyptian context in similar cases, as a form of justice which ‘would
consider state violence, the absence of reporting mechanisms, the political context of the
moment, leftist groups’ status in relation to the state, and the positionality of women’s
issues on the agenda of the broader political arena’.165 This vision echoes Makram-Ebeid’s
for a transformative justice approach which takes into account on the survivor’s position
in society as well as the ‘power imbalances between the female complainant and the two
accused male members of the party, both in terms of gender, but also in terms of social
power that comes from one of the defendants being a party leader and the other a member
of a prominent party’.166
This victim-based approach to justice in cases of sexual assault would also mean
prioritizing the victim’s right to choose which method they prefer to resort to in a given
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situation. As Makram-Ebeid points out, resorting to a criminal justice system investigation
and ‘having the state acknowledge the atrocities they have experienced’ is important to
some as a way of ‘feeling vindicated and... keeping their abusers at bay’. 167
Here, it is interesting to note how the ‘criminal justice system mimicked by the
investigation’168 of the Bread and Freedom Party is telling of a stunted political imaginary,
even from the self-proclaimed radical left. The investigators reproduced themselves as the
state saw them, but this is not an uncommon risk of embarking on transformative justice
approaches.169 As Mimi Kim writes, transformative justice is not only a method but ‘a
flexible set of politics and practices committed to collective and community-based
mobilization, nonpunitive practices of accountability, and a theory and practice of violence
prevention and intervention that addresses the context of historic and systemic
oppression’.170 That is, transformative justice is inextricably tied to the politics of the
community. Because of this, and as the Bread and Freedom Party case demonstrates,
community-based structures operating in communities without a strong commitment to
feminist justice will naturally end up reproducing the violence of the formal criminal
justice system.171
As demanding and messy as the process can be, 172 implementing alternative justice
approaches (such as transformative justice) in community spaces is something
interviewees highlighted as necessary for avoiding increasingly unjust state justice.173
These community spaces can be social justice-oriented workplaces, such as NGOs, or other
spaces such as political parties. An example of such an initiative can be found in the gender
unit of the Cairo-based Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR).
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EIPR only recently implemented its internal policy dedicated to dealing with cases of
sexual harassment in the workplace, detailing the steps to follow after an incident is
reported. The policy is an outcome of several years’ worth of drafting, and had actually
remained in draft form until its finalization was prompted by the Bread and Freedom Party
case investigation. Perhaps owing to the comparatively more democratic environment
provided by EIPR to its employees facilitatory of productive debate surrounding the issue,
or to the more ‘radical’ politics of individual members of the institution, EIPR’s policy is
written so as to avoid mirroring formal investigation processes. The instinct to form official
investigation committees, exhibited by the Bread and Freedom Party for example, is
absent. Informal routes are instead made available, through which employees can reach
out to a common friend or trusted person in the workplace and engage in a mediated
conversation to address the harm done. 174 Other civil society organizations and progressive
workplaces have used EIPR’s policy as a template, adapting the text for their purposes.
Whether or not the policy has been a success is difficult to say, due to the secretive nature
of the process.175
For the most part, one point that was emphasized by all three interviewees is the
importance of experimenting, learning, and expanding the capacity for imagination in
general. For example, during an interview conducted with a former member of OpAntiSH,
it was highlighted how, for older generations in Egypt (middle-aged and older during the
2011 uprising), ideas of liberation and justice continue to be tied in with the nation,
independence, and sovereignty. That is, to think of justice without the state would
necessitate a ‘departure from the immediate imaginary’.176 This emphasis on imagination
is especially meaningful given the place held by the concept for social movement theory.
The radical imagination is theorized by Max Haiven and Alex Khasnabish as a sociological
process vital to resisting a long list of consequences triggered by the enclosures of Europe
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– primarily, capitalism.177 In the more contemporary moment, Haiven and Khasnabish
understand the radical imagination to be especially significant in the face of ‘the grim,
merciless and zombielike ideology of austerity’.178 Their description is perhaps best
exemplified by capitalist realism, or ‘the widespread sense that not only is capitalism the
only viable political and economic system, but also that it is now impossible even to
imagine a coherent alternative to it’.179 The process of the radical imagination, put simply,
is ‘the ability to imagine the world, life and social institutions not as they are but as they
might otherwise be’.180 More specifically, Haiven and Khasnabish caution against the
understanding of the radical imagination as an individual undertaking: ‘the imagination...
is not merely the ‘private property’ of the individual...We create, with those around us,
multiple, overlapping, contradictory and coexistent imaginary landscapes, horizons of
common possibility and shared understanding’.181
The interviews conducted for this thesis reveal that this communal aspect of the radical
imagination is invaluable. Indeed, rather than expressions of nostalgia to a ‘lighter’
moment of brief optimism or triumph experienced in the immediate aftermath of the 2011
uprising, the longing was for the space to exchange different strategies and ideas – to
‘fight’, whether it happened between movements or within the same one. When asked
about how to move forward towards a more ‘feminist’ future of justice (with all the
ambiguities contained within the terms), the answers always relied on community: most
prominently, communities of art, civil society, or academia sharing, learning and
unlearning strategies related to sexual assault.
If, as Saidiya Hartman points out (and Haiven and Khasnabish would agree), ‘so much of
the work of oppression is about policing the imagination’,182 then certainly the
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unimaginative and unrelenting resort to prison (powered by an equally relentless state of
emergency in the Egyptian context) is a similar kind of work in action. It is through the
slow and deliberate process of constructing a counter-imagination that remaining and
emerging movements can begin to work towards a different and possible future.
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VI.

Conclusion

In this project, I have attempted to envision an emergence of an anticarceral feminist
movement in Egypt. Towards this goal, I have described what is identified as a carceral
moment taking place in contemporary Egypt, characterized by an increased resort to
incarceration as a means to eliminate political, social, and any other perceived threats to
governance, as well as the total elimination of due process within the legal system. The
majority of criticism directed towards the state in connection with this process on the part
of activists, however, is concerned with political prisoners, the innocence of which is often
emphasized as an argument for their release. I argued that, in this process, criticism of the
prison as such, as an inherently antifeminist tool of oppression, is missing. From this point,
I have tried to understand how feminist activism in Egypt overlooked this theoretical
standpoint, with the dominant approach to ‘justice’ being carceral.
A few explanations were suggested: from the ‘carceral turn’ in feminism as a phenomenon
coinciding with the rise of neoliberal policies globally and subsequent NGOization of
radical local movements, to the unattainability of the mutual requirement of
destruction/construction required by abolitionist politics as theorized in the United States,
and finally, the endless state of emergency imposed on social and political movements
(and generally) in the country. I argued that the unrelenting persistence of such a state has
played a role in creating movements whose bar is consistently and forcibly set too low in
terms of emancipatory vision or demands. In tracing the presence of movements,
collectives or even individual activists that have, whether actively or not, countered the
dominant, carceral approach, this project (hopefully) demonstrates the promise of a new
justice imaginary, guided by alternative approaches (such as transformative justice) which
recognize the state’s tools of justice (prison, primarily) as inherently antifeminist tools of
repression, incapable of producing genuine justice.
Having said this, the project is not intended to be read as a call to abandon recourse to the
criminal justice system in spite of the victim’s wishes. As anti-carceral feminists explain
and as demonstrated above, eschewing reliance on the law is only one half of the equation
in the road to abolition. The other half consists of building, or imagining, the alternative.
This process, as revealed during the research phase of this project, is not a linear one with
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a start and finish line. Rather, and as emphasized by all three interviewees, it is one which
takes time and builds on ongoing conversations, or as they put it, ‘fights’, about what it
means to achieve feminist justice.
Therefore, wary of how ‘critiques of the neoliberal law and order state have become
increasingly tied to a repudiation of feminism’183 in general, this work is not intended to
be read as a criticism of an already fragile local feminist presence. It instead suggests
further reflection when faced with the perhaps instinctive reaction of finding refuge within
the state and the law, and imagining what it would mean to be able to find it without.
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